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Abstract: While online shopping are becoming more accepted by
people in modern life, cardholders are more concerned about card
fraud and the lack of cardholder authentication in the current online
credit card payment. This paper proposes a purchase protocol with
live cardholder authentication for online transaction which combines
telephone banking and online banking together. The order informa-
tion and payment information are sent though the Internet and en-
crypted by asymmetric key encryption. The cardholder is authenti-
cated by the card issuing bank ringing back at the customer’s phone
number and the cardholder inputting the secure PIN and the amount
to pay. The multichannel authentication makes the cardholder feel
secure and card fraud difficult. Furthermore, the protocol does not
require the cardholder to obtain public key certificates or install ad-
ditional software for the online transaction.
Keywords: online credit card payment, card fraud, multichannel
authentication
1. Introduction
When a cardholder presents his credit card at a retailer
shop, the card is read by a card reader and the cardholder is re-
quired to input a PIN. After the PIN is verified, the transaction
is approved to go ahead. The possession of the four-digit PIN
is used to authenticate the cardholder. Cardholder signature
was used in the past but is replaced by Chip and PIN because
it is easier to forge a signature than guessing a PIN.
The process is different when a credit card is used online.
Most online shopping sites only require the input of card de-
tails including the three digits at the back of the card. Another
person other than the cardholder may get hold of the informa-
tion and use it shopping online. The lack of cardholder au-
thentication in the current online payment has resulted in on-
line shopping fraud being one of the major card frauds. Card-
holders are becoming more concerned about releasing their
card information. Secure protocols are needed to enhance the
security of online shopping.
Ideally, a secure protocol for online transaction should pro-
vide mutual authentication of a customer and a merchant; that
is to authenticate that a cardholder is a legitimate user of a
payment card account, and that a merchant can accept a pay-
ment card transactions. In addition, the payment information
should be always confidential and data integrity should be en-
sured. Apart from the requirements in the aspects of security,
an online credit card payment system should also be easy to
deploy in real world without burdening the card issuer, the
merchant and the cardholder too much. The system must
be easy to use for the cardholder who chooses online shop-
ping initially for the benefits of its convenience. The protocol
should also let the cardholder feel secure.
Many solutions have been proposed for thwarting credit
card fraud [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. Among them [2, 3, 5], the common
way of authenticating a cardholder is to use digital signature
based on the public key infrastructure (PKI). This requires the
cardholder to have a public key certificate before commenc-
ing an online purchase, which makes the task at cardholder
side impractical and inconvenient. As a result, the cardholder
authentication is omitted in some of the schemes [3, 4].
This paper is motivated by providing a purchase protocol
with live cardholder authentication in online purchase pro-
cedure similar to the Chip and PIN used at the onsite shop-
ping. It combines telephone banking and online banking to-
gether. The order information and payment information are
sent though the Internet and encrypted using asymmetric key
encryption. The cardholder authentication is done through the
public switched telephone network (PSTN) by the card issu-
ing bank ringing back at the customer’s contact phone number
and requesting the input of the secure PIN and the amount to
pay.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 dis-
cusses the related work in online payment schemes. Section
3 presents the protocol including its assumptions, notations
and major phases. Section 4 analyzes the protocol from the
view of security and usability, respectively. Finally section 5
summarizes the paper.
2. Related Work
2.1 Authentiation in Credit Card Payment
Shemes
The Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) protocol [5] was
devised by Visa and Mastercard; it achieves high security
by five sub-protocols together: cardholder registration, mer-
chant registration, purchase request, payment authorization,
and payment capture. SET requires all participation entities
including the cardholder to have public key certificates before
a purchase. Because of the complicity and high overhead of
the protocol and its dependency on the PKI, SET has not been
implemented in the industry after its design in 1997.
Different from the SET, credit card payment using Secure
Socket Layer (SSL) [3] is widely accepted in e-business. SSL
provides data confidentiality by using symmetric key encryp-
tion which is faster than the public key encryption, and mer-
chant authentication by digital signature. The authentication
of the cardholder is seldom deployed since a cardholder usu-
ally does not have a public key certificate. Nevertheless, us-
ing symmetric key encryption enables the merchant to access
the payment details of the cardholder and in many cases store
such information in its database. Once the database is tam-
pered, the lost data may cause more cases of card fraud.
Recently, PayPal [6] has been popular among cardhold-
ers because it does not require the input of card details on-
line. Instead, a valid email address is considered as a Pay-
Pal account identifier and used for online payment. However,
PayPal has poor authentication during its registration phase
through which the payment information such as card details
or account number and sort code are associated with a valid
email address. Once the association is created, using the valid
email address and the correct password will make the bank
account or credit card to pay for a purchase. An attacker Eve
could easily register by Bob’s bank account details and her
email address, and get Bob to pay for her shopping later on.
Another effort to avoid repetitively use of card details is
to use one-time credit card transaction number (CCT) [4]. A
CTT is used only once, thereby whether the CCT is stored by
the merchant or stolen by an attacker does not matter after its
use. The concern is that CCTs do not provide authentication
of the cardholder. The current CCT in use is stored on the
credit card, and once the card is inserted into a card reader, a
new CCT will be calculated based on a secret stored on the
card and known to the issuing bank. The issuing bank can
verify which card is being used but not who is using the card.
The proposed protocol in this paper is light-weighted,
much less complex than SET, and has less computation over-
head. This is because the protocol uses asymmetric key
encryption only without the complexity of digital envelope
which contains both asymmetric and symmetric key encryp-
tions. Unlike SSL using fast symmetric encryption only, this
protocol uses dual signature to ensure that the merchant does
not get access to the user’s account details.
2.2 Multihannel Authentiation
As Wong and Stajano discussed in [7, 8] the idea of using
multiple channels in security protocols has been existed long
before we realized them. Protocol messages being transmitted
through multiple communication channels of different secu-
rity properties offers significant advantages for the protocol’s
security and usability. An early example of multiple chan-
nel protocol is in an ad hoc networking environment where a
device (duckling) gets imprinted via physical contact before
communicating with others via wireless channels [9].
Multichannels are also proposed to authenticating Internet
users in web-based services especially electronic commerce
services. Many patents are filed around the idea of using
PSTN to authenticate users. In [10], an authentication server
is connected to two networks and receives custom order in-
formation from one network and forwards the confirmation
request to the other. In [11] a mobile phone or other commu-
nications terminal associated with a user is used. A vending
node communicates with an authentication platform which ei-
ther returns a telephone number to be displayed for the user
to call or which calls the alleged user’s phone or terminal for
confirmation. Similar ideas are found in [12, 13, 14, 15, 16].
However, these patents do not specify an explicit protocol to
use.
Cellular phone networks are chosen by commercial authen-
tication service providers for Internet services such as Signify
[17], Identrica [18], SaintLogin [19] and SecureCall [20] as
an authentication channel besides the Internet because of cel-
lular networks’ popularity worldwide. These authentication
services use a centralized authentication server to link with
the Internet service provider. The authentication server sends
one-time password over SMS to authenticate users in [17].
Users are requested to call a static [18] or a one-time phone
number [19] at the authentication server. Alternatively, the au-
thentication server in [20] calls back the user’s cellular phone
and requests the input of user PIN. These authentication mod-
els can be further applied when a session-id is created between
the web service provider and a PC using a barcode reader on
a mobile phone [21].
The proposed protocol is similar to SecureCall [20] in call-
ing back the user and requests the input of user PIN. However,
the protocol does not use a separate authentication server as
in SecureCall but integrates the calling back function with the
card issuing bank, and uses a landline rather than a cellular
phone. This makes the protocol securer at the loss of mobil-
ity.
3. The Purchase Protocol
3.1 Assumptions
It is assumed that a cardholder trusts the branded bank that
issues him a credit card. He has to if he is willing to deposit
his money in the bank. When obtaining a credit card the card-
holder has given his personal information to the bank such as
identity, date of birth, addresses, contact email address, and
contact telephone number(s). The financial and personal in-
formation is kept safely by the bank. The bank gives the cus-
tomer a PIN to use. Of course, initially, the bank has authen-
ticated the cardholder by his identification document such as
driving licence, passport and billing address.
It is also assumed that a PKI exists to facilitate the protocol.
All the business entities including merchants, payment gate-
ways, card issuing banks, and merchant acquiring banks have
registered with some Certificate Authority (CA) and been is-
sued public key certificates. The CA or a cluster of CAs are
trusted by all the business entities. The honesty of a merchant
should have been checked during the registration procedure
(which is actually a bit risky). A cautious customer always
checks a merchant’s recent credit before deciding to buy a
good from the merchant online. These entities should have at
least two private and public key pairs; one used for encryption
and the other for signature. The business entities know the
public keys of one another.
It is not assumed that a cardholder has obtained a public
key certificate before purchasing online because it is imprac-
tical to ask all the cardholders to do so. However, a card-
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Figure 1. The purchase protocol with live authentication
holder trusts the CAs that issue the public key certificates for
the business entities. The cardholder does not have to know
the public keys of the business entities.
3.2 The Purhase Protool
Figure 1 plots the sequence of the purchase protocol which
includes five phases:
1. Purchase request: the cardholder initializes a purchase
request and sends it to the merchant. This is done in step
S.1.
2. Authorization and authentication request: the merchant
processes the purchase request and sends an authoriza-
tion and authentication request to the payment gateway.
This is done in step S.2.
3. Authorization and authentication: the payment gateway
processes the authorization and authentication request,
passes it to the card issuing bank who then authenticates
the cardholder through the PSTN. This phase includes
steps S.3, S.4, and S.5.
4. Authorization and authentication response: The card is-
suing bank sends an authorization and authentication re-
sponse back to the payment gateway who then instructs
the merchant acquiring bank and the merchant. This
phase includes steps S.6, S.7 and S.8.
5. Purchase response: The merchant sends an purchase re-
sponse back to the cardholder. This is done in step S.9.
The above phases are explained in details below. The
notations in use are listed in Table 1.
Phase 1: Purchase Request.
(S.1) The cardholder browsers the merchant’s shopping
site and finds the goods that he wants to buy. When the pay-
Table 1. Notations
Notation Meaning
C Cardholder
M Merchant
P Payment gateway
CardB Card issuing bank
pubEK Encryption key of a public key pair
priDK Decryption key of a public key pair
pubV K Verification key of a public key pair
priSK Signing key of a public key pair
XID Global unique transaction ID
OrderInfo Order information
PayInfo Payment information
PurAmt Purchase amount
OIEnrypt Encrypted order details
PIEnrypt Encrypted payment details
CardSign Cardholder signatures
auCode Authorization and authentication code
ment information pops out, he fills in his credit card informa-
tion. When the cardholder clicks the “submit” button, a Java
applet is downloaded from the merchant’s shopping site – we
call it a payment applet. When the payment applet is down-
loaded to the cardholder site, it obtains from the merchant site
the public keys of the payment gateway and the merchant, and
a nounce that serves as a globally unique transaction identifier.
After the payment applet is downloaded to the cardholder’s
machine, it locally generates an asymmetric key pair for the
cardholder because the cardholder may not have an issued cer-
tificate as the merchant and the payment gateway. The asym-
metric key pair is used for providing the integrity of the order
and payment information but not for authenticating the card-
holder.
The payment applet sends the order and the payment infor-
mation to the merchant’s shopping site using dual encryption
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to ensure that the merchant can only read the order details but
not the payment details.
C  > M : OIEncrypt, PIEncrypt, CardSign (1)
where the payment applet has computed the following.
OIEncrypt =
CryptpubEK
M
(XID, OrderInfo, pubVK
C
;
pubEK
C
;Hash(XID, PayInfo, PurAmt)) (2)
PIEncrypt =
CryptpubEK
P
(XID, PayInfo, PurAmt, pubVK
C
;
Hash(XID, OrderInfo)) (3)
CardSign =
SignpriSK
C
(Hash(XID, OrderInfo),
Hash(XID, PayInfo, PurAmt)) (4)
The encrypted order details are shown in (2). The payment
applet first combines the globally unique transaction identi-
fier, the payment information which includes the credit card
number, expire date, cardholder name, etc, and the purchase
amount that the cardholder needs to pay. It then calculates
the hash of the combination, and concatenates the hash value
with the transaction identifier, the order information that may
include goods description, price, etc, and the verification key
of the cardholder. The payment applet then encrypts the con-
catenation by the public key of the merchant’s encryption key
pair.
As shown in (3), the encrypted payment details are in a
similar format as the encrypted order details. The payment
applet combines the transaction identifier and the order infor-
mation, and calculates the hash of the combination. The pay-
ment applet then concatenates the hash value with the transac-
tion identifier, the payment information, the purchase amount
that the cardholder needs to pay, and the verification key of
the cardholder. Similarly, the payment applet encrypts every-
thing by the public key of the payment gateway’s encryption
key pair.
(4) expresses the cardholder signature on the hash values
of the order details and the payment details. The hash values
are duplicated in the signature, the encrypted order details,
and the encrypted payment details, so that various parties can
verify the integrity of the information. By this way, although
the payment details are kept secret to the merchant, and the
payment gateway merchant does not know what the pay is
for, either of them is able to verify the integrity of the piece
of information that is only known to the other.
Phase 2: Authorization and Authentication Request.
(S.2) After receiving the purchase request, the merchant
decrypts the encrypted order details, and verifies the integrity
of the order details by calculating the hash value of the order
details and then comparing the value with the one contained
in the cardholder’s signature. The merchant also verifies the
hash value of the payment details by comparing the two values
of the payment details in the encrypted order details and the
cardholder’s signature.
If the verifications are successful, the merchant combines
the transaction identity, the encrypted payment details which
it cannot read, the cardholder’s signature, the hash value of
the order details, and the verification key of the cardholder.
The merchant signs everything, encrypts its signature using
the payment gateway’s public key, and sends the encrypted
message to the payment gateway (5).
M  > P :
CryptpubEK
P
(SignpriSK
M
(XID, PIEncrypt, CardSign,
Hash(XID, OrderInfo), pubSK
C
) (5)
Phase 3: Authorization and Authentication
(S.3) The payment gateway decrypts the encrypted pay-
ment details by using its own private key and the public key of
the merchant. It calculates the hash value of the payment de-
tails and compares it with the one supplied in the cardholder’s
signature. The payment gateway also verifies the integrity of
the order details by comparing the hash value from the de-
crypted message and the one contained in the cardholder’s
signature. Successful verifications show that the cardholder
and the merchant agree on the transaction.
The payment gateway then combines the global transaction
identifier, the payment information and the purchase amount.
It calculates the hash of the combinations, and signs the hash
value. The payment gateway concatenates the combination
and the signature, and encrypts the concatenation by the credit
card issuing bank’s public key. The encrypted message is for-
warded to the issuing bank (6).
P  > CardB :
CryptpubEK
CardB
(XID, PayInfo, PurAmt,
SignpriSK
P
(Hash(XID, PayInfo, PurAmt))) (6)
(S.4) After receiving the authorization and authentication
request, the card issuing bank checks the payment details of
the cardholder in its database and finds the contact number of
the cardholder. The bank rings back to the cardholder’s prime
phone number which is a land line or a mobile phone, and asks
the cardholder to confrim the transaction by inputting the PIN
of the credit card and the purchase amount of the transaction.
(S.5) The cardholder inputs the PIN through the number
pad on his phone as he does on a card reader in a retail shop-
ping site, press #, and then inputs the purchase amount omit-
ting the numbers after the decimal point, and press # again to
end the confirmation. Data is sent through PSTN provided by
the telephone service provider.
The protocol authenticates the cardholder by four condi-
tions: the correct credit card details, use of the right telephone,
correct PIN, and correct purchase amount. Missing any of
these conditions will make the transaction unsuccessful. The
input of the correct purchase amount allows the cardholder to
tell for which purchase this confirmation is in case that the
cardholder has used the same card twice in a short time.
Phase 4: Authorization and Authentication Response.
(S.6) The issuing bank sends an authorization and authen-
tication code back to the payment gateway if it receives the
right PIN and right purchase amount back though the PSTN.
If the PIN is wrong, a response code is sent back and used
to denote any error that might have had occurred during the
verification or transaction process (7).
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CardB  > P :
CryptpubEK
P
(XID, PurAmt, auCode,
SignpriSK
CardB
(Hash(XID, PurAmt, auCode)))
(7)
(S.7) The payment gateway schedules debiting the card-
holder’s account and crediting the merchant’s acquiring ac-
count.
(S.8) The payment gateways sends the authorization and
authentication code to the merchant shopping site to inform
the merchant to be ready to issue the goods (8).
P  > M :
CryptpubEK
M
(XID, PurAmt, auCode,
SignpriSK
P
(Hash(XID, PurAmt, auCode))) (8)
Phase 5: Purchase Response.
(S.9) The merchants shopping site generates and sends
feedback to the cardholder based on the authorization /
response code received by the payment gateway. Some
of the codes may be interpreted as: “You card has been
billed.”,“Insufficient funds.” or “Incorrect PIN.”.
M  > C :
CryptpubEK
C
(XID, PurAmt, auCode,
SignpriSK
M
(Hash(XID, PurAmt, auCode))) (9)
4. Protocol Analysis
Yu etc. compared electronic payment systems in [22] from
the aspects of technology, economy, social, institution and
law. We analyze the proposed rotocol from security, economic
and social aspects in this section.
4.1 Seurity
Confidentiality of the message is provided by asymmetric
key encryption. The messages are always encrypted by the
receiver’s public key in its encryption key pair. This is based
on the assumption that the business entities either know each
other’s public key at the moment of the transaction or can ob-
tain the public key through other channels when necessary.
The order details are just known to the cardholder and the
merchant. More importantly, the payment details are known
to the cardholder, the payment gateway and the card issuing
bank only, making the merchant impossible to store the card
information in its database. This avoids card frauds in case of
an attack is mounted on the database.
Integrity of the order details and the payment details is as-
sured by the payment applet at the cardholder side signing
the hash values of the order details and the payment details.
The merchant and the payment gateway verify both the hash
values of the order details and payment details separately al-
though either of them can only read the order details or the
payment details alone. The verification key of the cardholder
is encrypted and sent to the merchant and payment gateway.
Integrity of the data exchanged between the payment gateway
and the card issuing bank is provided by the signature on the
hash value of the data.
Authentication of the cardholder is done through PSTN.
The cardholder needs to pick up the phone call from the bank
at the prime contact number that he has given to the bank ini-
tially or updated afterwards. He then keys in the correct PIN
and the correct purchase amount omitting the numbers after
the decimal point. If the phone number is a fixed line, it makes
a card fraud difficult unless someone breaks into the house.
Choosing a mobile phone number makes the online shopping
mobile and more convenient, but it has the risk that the card-
holder may lose his credit card and mobile phone together. In
this case the authentication only lies in the confidentiality of
the PIN. Authentication of the merchant is through its signa-
ture on the hash value of the message to be sent. This is the
same for the payment gateway and the card issuing bank.
Non-repudiation of the transaction is provided in the pro-
tocol through phase 4 of authorization and authentication re-
sponse and phase 5 of purchase response. Once the cardholder
confirms his purchase via telephone, he cannot deny the order
given he is the true owner of the card. On the merchant side,
if he confirms the transaction went through in purchase re-
sponse, he should ship the goods to the cardholder; otherwise
he should not charge the cardholder. The cardholder can use
his credit card bill and the merchant’s purchase response mes-
sage as proof in case of a dispute.
4.2 Formal Model
The above general analysis can be proved by inductive
method of protocol verification Isabelle/HOL [23] in which a
protocol is modelled by the set of all possible traces of events
that it can generate. We have not verified the protocol yet but
specified the key phases in Isabelle. Phase 3 of authorization
and authentication is shown in Fig. 2 while phases 1, 2, 4 and
5 are attached in the appendix.
The Isabelle events’ expressions and meanings are ex-
plained in Table 2. There are three existing forms of events
in Isabelle, i.e., Says, Gets, and Notes. It is not assumed,
however, that a Says A B X implies a Gets A X event
because the messageX is sent over an insecure network Inter-
net. We define two new events Calls and Answers that hap-
pen through PSTN. They are used in SET Phase3 :2 and
SET Phase3 :3 of Fig. 2 when the card issuing back au-
thenticates the cardholder through PSTN. The protocol speci-
fication is rather self explanatory when referring to the pro-
tocol explanation in Section 3. We should notice that the
event Says C CardB fj(Number (PIN C); Number
PurAmtjg in SET Phase3 :3 is transmitted through PSTN
too.
Table 2. Isalelle events
Event Meaning
Says A B X A sends message X to B
Gets A X A receives message X
Notes A X A stores X in its internal state
Calls A X A calls phone number X
Answers A X A answers phone number X
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SET Phase3 :1 :
JevsPhase3 :1 2 set pur ;
Gets P Crypt (pubEK P )
Sign (priSK M)
fjNumber XID; PIEnrypt; CardSign;
Hash fjNumber XID; Number OrderInfojg; Key (pubV K C)jg
2 set evsPhase3 :1 K
=) Says P CardB Crypt (pubEK CardB)
fjNumber XID; Number PayInfo; Number PurAmt;
Sign (priSK P )
Hash fjNumber XID; Number PayInfo; Number PurAmtjgjgjg
# evsPhase3 :1 2 set pur
SET Phase3 :2 :
JevsPhase3 :2 2 set pur ;
Notes CardB (Number (PhoneNumber C));
Gets CardB Crypt (pubEK CardB)
fjNumber XID; Number PayInfo; Number PurAmt;
Sign (priSK P )
Hash fjNumber XID; Number PayInfo; Number PurAmtjgjgjg
2 set evsPhase3 :2 K
=) Calls CardB (Number; (PhoneNumber C))
# evsPhase3 :2 2 set pur
SET Phase3 :3 :
JevsPhase3 :3 2 set pur ;
Notes C (Number (PIN C));
Answers C (Number; (PhoneNumber C))
2 set evsPhase3 :3 K
=) Says C CardB fj(Number (PIN C); Number PurAmtjg
# evsPhase3 :3 2 set pur
Figure 2. Isabelle expressions of the purchase protocol. Phase 3: authorization and authentication.
4.3 Attak
To mount a card fraud attack in the protocol, an attacker
must know the card details, the PIN, and the prime contact
telephone number that the cardholder leaves at the bank. The
attacker should also have control of the phone during a pur-
chase. The attacker might get the payment details thorough
packet intercepting or database stealing; he may even get the
PIN through shoulder surfing when the cardholder inputs his
PIN in a supermarket. The attacker then has to steal the card-
holder’s hand phone or break into the cardholder’s house in
order to validate the authentication and authorization, which
a high technology attacker normally doesn’t like to do. Alter-
natively the attacker may attempt the PSTN, but it is not easy
attempting the PSTN thanks to its closed architecture. It is
assumed that the calling back is done through the traditional
PSTN but not voice over IP (VoP).
In the protocol the cardholder has direct contact with the
merchant and the card issuing bank, but not the payment
gateway; the payment gateway in this way is transparent to
the cardholder. A malicious payment gateway Alice can re-
encrypt a received authorization and authentication request to
generate a valid request for another payment gateway Bob
using Bob’s public key. Bob would then waste resources
when processing the ingenuine request, resulting in Denial-
of-Service for other genuine requests. A bad merchant could
also collude with a payment gateway so as they both get card-
holder’s account details and shopping patterns.
4.4 Usability
The economic aspect lies in the following:
1. The cost of transaction. The deployment of the protocol
requires a PKI for the business entities. It also requires
the card issuing bank to call back at the cardholder’s pri-
mary phone number stored in its database and verifies
the PIN and purchase amount inputted by the cardholder.
These functions are deployable at the bank side with rea-
sonable cost.
2. Atomic exchange. During the transaction, the cardholder
will be charged if he confirms the purchase because he
sends the payment details to the merchant already. How-
ever, we cannot say the protocol provides atomic ex-
change since the cardholder consumes first but pay later.
3. User range. The protocol is limited to users who have a
credit card and a landline telephone.
4. Finiancial risk. The financial risk at the cardholder side
is low since the credit card company has taken most of
the risk.
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The social aspect lies in the following.
1. Anonymity. The protocol has good anonymity. Mer-
chants are unable to attain information about the card-
holder’s account; and the payment gateways are unable
to analyse the spending habits of the cardholder.
2. Convenience. The protocol keeps the functions at the
customer side as simple as possible. It does not require a
cardholder to obtain a public key certificate or install any
software for the purpose of online shopping. The card-
holder should accept the PIN authentication process eas-
ily because it is similar to the process of onsite shopping.
The live verification process also gives the cardholder a
sense of security.
3. Mobility. The protocol is poor in terms of mobility. A
cardholder is only able to authenticate himself through
PSTN at the place with the landline telephone whose
number he leaves with the bank.
5. Summary
Current online credit card payment is not secure due to
its lack of cardholder authentication. This paper proposes a
purchase protocol with mutichannel authentication of card-
holder for online credit card payment which combines tele-
phone banking and online banking together. The protocol
has five phases: (1) purchase request, (2) authorization and
authentication request, (3) authorization and authentication,
(4) authorization and authentication response, and (5) pur-
chase response. The order information and payment informa-
tion are sent though the Internet and encrypted by asymmetric
key encryption. The protocol authenticates the cardholder by
the card issuing bank ringing back at the customer’s contact
phone number and the cardholder inputting the secure PIN
and the price to pay. The live authentication of cardholder
makes a cardholder feel secure and card fraud difficult. Fur-
thermore, the cardholder does not need to obtain public key
certificates or install additional software for the transaction.
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Appendix
SET Phase1 :
JevsPhase1 2 set pur ; M = Merhant ; P = Payment gateway ; C = Cardholder ;
Key (priSK C) 62 used evsPhase1 ; (priSK C ) 6= 0 ;
Key (pubV K C) 62 used evsPhase1 ;
Key (priDK C) 62 used evsPhase1 ; (priDK C ) 6= 0 ;
Key (pubEK C) 62 used evsPhase1 ;
OIEnrypt = Crypt (pubEK M)
fjNumber XID; Number OrderInfo; Key (pubV K C); Key (pubEK C)
Hash fjNumber XID; Number PayInfo; Number PurAmtjgjg;
PIEnrypt = Crypt (pubEK P )
fjNumber XID; Number PayInfo; Key (pubV K C)
Hash fjNumber XID; Number OrderInfojgjg;
CardSign = Sign (priSK C)
fjHash fjNumber XID; Number OrderInfojg;
Hash fjNumber XID; Number PayInfo; Number PurAmtjgjg;
Gets C fjKey (pubEK M); Key (pubEK P ); Number XIDjg
2 set evsPhase1 K
=) Says C M fjOIEnrypt; P IEnrypt; CardSignjg
# Notes C (Number XID)
# evsPhase1 2 set pur
Figure 3. Isabelle expressions of the purchase protocol. Phase 1: purchase request.
SET Phase2 :
JevsPhase2 2 set pur ;
Gets M fjOIEnrypt; P IEnrypt; CardSignjg;
2 set evsPhase2 K
=) Says M P Crypt (pubEK P )
Sign (priSK M)
fjNumber XID; PIEnrypt; CardSign;
Hash fjNumber XID; Number OrderInfojg; Key (pubV K C)jg
# evsPhase2 2 set pur
Figure 4. Isabelle expressions of the purchase protocol. Phase 2: authorization and authentication
request.
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SET Phase4 :1 :
JevsPhase4 :1 2 set pur ;
Notes CardB fj(Number (PIN C));
Gets CardB Crypt (pubEK CardB)
fjNumber XID; Number PayInfo; Number PurAmt;
Sign (priSK P )
Hash fjNumber XID; Number PayInfo; Number PurAmtjgjgjg;
Gets CardB fjNumber (PIN C); Number PurAmtjg
2 set evsPhase4 :1 K
=) Says CardB P Crypt (pubEK P )
fjNumber XID; Number PurAmt; Number auCode;
Sign (priSK CardB)
Hash fjNumber XID; Number PurAmt; Number auCodejgjgjg
# evsPhase4 :1 2 set pur
SET Phase4 :2 :
JevsPhase4 :2 2 set pur ;
Gets P Crypt (pubEK P )
fjNumber XID; Number PurAmt; Number auCode;
Sign (priSK CardB)
HashfjNumber XID; Number PurAmt; Number auCodejgjgjg
2 set evsPhase4 :2 K
=) Says P M Crypt (pubEK M)
fjNumber XID; Number PurAmt; Number auCode;
Sign (priSK P )
Hash fjNumber XID; Number PurAmt; Number auCodejgjgjg
# evsPhase4 :2 2 set pur
Figure 5. Isabelle expressions of the purchase protocol. Phase 4: authorization and authentication
response.
JevsPhase5 2 set pur ;
Gets M Crypt (pubEK M)
fjNumber XID; Number PurAmt; Number auCode;
Sign (priSK P )
Hash fjNumber XID; Number PurAmt; Number auCodejgjgjg
2 set evsPhase5 K
=) Says M C Crypt (pubEK C)
fjNumber XID; Number PurAmt; Number auCode;
Sign (priSK M)
Hash fjNumber XID; Number PurAmt; Number auCodejgjgjg
# evsPhase5 2 set pur
Figure 6. Isabelle expressions of the purchase protocol. Phase 5: Purchase response.
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